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A"REAWIDE HOUSING POLICY: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES
by Norman Kruraholz
Director, Cleveland City Planning Commission
for the American Society for Public Administration
Housing and Areawide Policy Session
New York City, March 23, 1972
When I joined the Cleveland City Planning Commission in 1969,
I was anxiety-ridden but optimistic about the prospects for de-
veloping an areawide housing program to which the city might make
a contribution. I disagreed with those who were skeptical that
areawide housing policy could have as its primary goal not merely
more housing starts but the provision of many more housing choices
in the entire region for the poor and near-poor. I suggested that
the skeptics dismissed too lightly the egalitarian nature of
American ideals, the weight of recent legislation and the increas-
ing use of federal grant programs to induce areawide planning and
development.
Now, two and one-half years later, I am still anxiety-ridden but
my optimism is waning. I see a small record of achievement; one
suburb contiguous to Cleveland has actually built some housing
for low-income families and another is talking about the possibi-
lity of public housing for the elderly.
But these modest signs of progress have been all but over-
whelmed by the tide of region-wide indifference — if not actual
hostility — to the plight of the poor, the under-privileged,
the black and those of moderate income who suffer from our chronic
housing problem. The attitude of indifference seems to pervade
almost all local governments as well as the bureaucracies which
serve them.
In the past two and one-half years, the City of Cleveland, through
the leadership of its Planning Commission, has made three major
attempts to establish the framework of areawide housing policy.
To date, all have failed, frustrated by the intransigence of both
citizens and their leaders toward any change in the status quo.
The record of our recent attempts to shape areawide policy on
housing is instructive:
1. In January, 1971, the Cleveland City Planning Commission
proposed a "Fair-Share Plan (FSP) For Public Housing in
Cuyahoga County." FSP was designed to demonstrate
first, that every one of the sixty municipalities of
Cuyahoga County was in need of low income housing,
and second, that if all shared equally, the impact
on any one community would be slight. In the plan,
we arbitrarily assigned two percent of each community's
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1960 housing stock for public housing. In every case,
we found that the estimated number of families eligible
(by income) for public housing in that community would
exceed this arbitrarily selected "share" of public
housing units for that community.
It is well understood that the city lacks the power to
impose any such plan on other municipalities. Although
our housing authority has county-wide jurisdiction, the
authority may not build public housing in any community
without a prior "cooperation agreement" from the local
legislative body. Obviously, FSP was proposed mainly
as a basis for discussion.
FSP drew not discussion but storms of protest from
mayors and councilmen all over Cuyahoga County. Com-
munities whose FSP assignment would have been as few
as two or four public housing units complained bitterly
about this threat to "home rule."
Now, over a year later, the plan is moribund; it has
generated no support and little subsequent discussion.
Our efforts to encourage serious consideration and
public hearings have met with no success whatever.
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2. The second major effort came in February, 1971, when
our Planning Commission proposed that a new-town ten-
tatively named "Warren's Ridge" be built in the Cleve-
land area. As a first step, we submitted a pre-applica-
tion proposal to the Department of Housing and Urban
Development under Title IV of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968. We also petitioned the State
of Ohio for its support.
Warren's Ridge New Town called for the development of
some 865 acres of almost completely vacant land owned
by the city but located in a neighboring municipality
a few miles east of Cleveland. Unlike most new town
locations, the land is in the midst of a rapidly
urbanizing area. Access and infrastructure are already
well developed. Our plan proposed to evaluate many
social and administrative innovations within a resi-
dential community of 8,100 new homes one-third of which
were to be made available to families and individuals
of low and moderate income.
If FSP precipitated a storm of protest. Warren's Ridge
was met by a hurricane. Public meetings were held in
neighboring communities and politicians seized the issue
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to advance their political fortunes while telegrams,
petitions and manifestos of protest bearing hundreds
of signatures rained down on local newspapers, mayors,
congressmen and on the New Town Desk at HUD. The
stated basis of protest was the crowding of roads,
sewers and schools and "the challenge to our way of
life."
To date, the proposal has developed neither state nor
local support and HUD, reading the areawide tea-leaves,
has made no response to our pre-application proposal
at all. Meanwhile, private building of all types
goes on as usual in all areas adjoining the proposed
New Town.
3. The third example of our efforts to promote an areawide
housing policy has involved our regional planning agency,
the Northeast Ohio Areawide Planning Agency (NOACA.)
NOACA is responsible for planning and A-95 reviews in
the seven county region of which Cleveland is the central
city. Circular A-95 (of the federal Office of Management
and Budget) indicates that regional planning agencies
should review federal grant applications and NOACA, in
company with most such agencies, does just that; reviews
and rubber-stamps its endorsement.
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But HUD regulations require that NQACA do much more.
Behind our strong initiative, HUD has asked that the
agency deal as well with the substantive problems of
the region, of which housing for low-income families
is surely one. We have insisted that NQACA's work
program include a housing element in line with federal
guidelines on equality and "open communities." We have
asked that the housing element go beyond mere data-
gathering to the development of hard policies and
programs designed to weaken racial exclusion and expand
the regional housing choices open to the poor and near-
poor.
But the politicians who control NQACA's Board have
refused to be moved, despite the prospect of losing
sorely needed federal funds for the seven county region.
At this point, the proposed housing element is still
not part of the NOACA work program and the Agency, which
was decertified by HUD in June of 1971, continues de-
certified.
While these three examples of Cleveland's efforts to move toward
an equity-based areawide housing policy are somewhat unique, the
official reaction to our efforts is not at all unlike reactions to
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similar attempts in other areas. The many jurisdictions in metro-
politan areas have all the legal weapons they need to "protect"
themselves against any change in the status quo. They have a hous-
ing "policy" although it is unwritten: it is to resist. There is
no other consensus on areawide housing objectives. This is parti-
cularly true when an essential goal of housing policy is, as it
has been in our case, the expansion of regional housing oppor-
tunities for the poor and near-poor. We might have been more
successful with proposals for higher housing densities in the
region or planned unit developments, but it has been our insistence
upon equity which has provided the focus for resistance.
This should surprise no one. Although equity as a goal has strong
support in federal regulations and in political rhetoric, it has
never received much attention either in the formulation of area-
wide policies or in metropolitan reorganization. Our attempts to
resolve the problems of our metropolitan areas have uniformly
concentrated on service and the ease of administration rather than
on considerations of equity.
The park districts, sewer and water districts, stadium and trans-
portation authorities which abound on the metropolitan scene were
neither conceived nor constructed in terms of equity. These
entities were developed solely on the basis of the need for service
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and efficiency. But the promise of efficiency says nothing about
the appropriateness of policy, nor about the relevance of program,
nor about the incidence of benefits and costs to different economic
groups in the region. One who seeks elements of equity in such
bodies will be disappointed.
Our contentment with service and efficiency answers to metropolitan
problems presents us with major difficulties when we try to frame
areawide housing policies based on equity.
By concentrating attention on functional needs and
organizational efficiency, we have assiduously avoided
the deeper and more controversial questions of areawide
policy including low-income housing distribution, racial
assimilation, economic segregation and fiscal inequali-
ties.
By retaining local governmental autonomy and direct
control through referendum elections at the local
level, we have assured the perpetuation of "communi-
ties of limited liability" possessing a powerful inertia
which supports the status quo, with its severe oppor-
tunity imbalance.
By supporting numerous units of local government all
based on the image of the homogeneous residential
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neighborhood we have divorced resources from responsi-
bilities and rights from duties. Further, we have
practically guaranteed that neither the local govern-
ments nor the consensus upon which they rest will
support housing ventures based on region-wide oppor-
tunity. Moreover, as our experience in Cleveland in-
dicates we have helped produce a situation where some
local governments can and will block the efforts of
others to develop equitable areawide housing policies.
It seems clear that areavide housing policies designed to increase
choices for lev/- and moderate-income families throughout the
region are unlikely to emerge from the efforts of local govern-
ments. As we have seen, local governments act with vigor to
obstruct equity-based regional housing programs, and power clearly
lies with those who would insulate themselves against equity.
The "urban county" approach also seems unlikely to produce equity-
based policies in housing. While the county may satisfy some of
the demands for "stop-gap" measures such as contractural cost-
cutting services among local units, it retains the individual
nuclei of resistance to equity-based schemes.
Similarly, such policies are unlikely to emerge from areawide agen-
cies such as councils of government or regional planning agencies
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which conceive their responsibilities as limited to programs of
efficiency. Rural and suburban officials perceive areawide
agencies as a threat to local autonomy and act defensively, while
central-city officials fear that these agencies may come between
them and the higher levels of government on which they count
heavily for aid.
Perhaps more equity-based planning and programming activities in
housing will be forthcoming from areawide agencies in the future.
That, however, depends on the willingness of the federal government
— specifically HUD — to use the fiscal inducements of its grant
programs on a much broader and more-coordinated scale in behalf of
equity than it has to date.
If local governments, areawide agencies and even such governmental
rearrangements as metro or urban counties are unable to base plan-
ning and programming on equity considerations, are we left to
presume that there is no remedy in our country for the millions of
Americans who live in dilapidated, inadequate, unsafe housing? Is
there no remedy for this imbalance of opportunity?
I think there is. I see the federal and state governments filling
the necessary role of balancer. Local governments, which are
closest to the people in theory, have not been so in fact — at
least not to the nation's wretchedly housed or racial minorities.
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Those who live in our ghettos, barrios and rural poverty pockets
are often closer to the federal establishment than to City Hall.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has put it well:
Local government is characteristically the govern-
ment of the locally powerful, not of the locally
powerless; and the best way the locally powerless
have found to sustain their rights against the
locally powerful is through resort to the national
government . . . . The growth of national power,
far from producing government less "responsive to
the individual person," has given a majority of
Americans far more dignity and freedom than they
could win in a century of localism.
Equity in housing-choice opportunities has advocates — however
reluctant at times: the federal, and increasingly, the state govern-
ments. The federal government has both the necessary vision (as
evident in HUD and Civil Rights regulations) and the essential
money necessary to support or induce equity in housing opportuni-
ties.
I would like to endorse two specific programs which seem capable
of promoting region-wide equity in housing choices. The first of
these is a proposal for massive reform — total reform in U. S.
housing policy. The plan depends heavily on incentives provided
by federal subsidies to the private market. The second lies in the.
establishment of new state entities.
First, I propose the enactment of a National Allowance Program
to aid low and moderate-income households. This program would
— 11 ™
provide large-scale money support for housing. Decent housing
would then be within the financial ability of each household in
the United States. Such a program might utilize a siiding-scale
based on economic conditions of each region to relate the amount
of the housing allowance to the living standards (and housing
costs) of the region.
For example: in the City of Cleveland in 1969, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics has set the moderate standard of living budget for
a family of four at $10,453, and the moderate housing cost at
$1,662 or 15.8% of the total budget. The 15.8% housing expendi-
ture would be applied to all four-person families with incomes
below the moderate standard of living level. Thus, a family with
an income of $5,000 would receive an annual housing allowance of
$862 which would represent the difference between 15.8% of their
income, or $790, and the moderate standard of living housing
cost of $1,662.
In each region, every household with less than the "moderate level
of income" would be eligible. This would include poor individuals
and childless couples as well as families. At long last, we will
be addressing the housing needs of all Americans of low- and
moderate-income, rather than just that small percentage able to
take advantage of the few low-rent units available. And these
- 12 -
needs will not be held contingent on "cooperation agreements,"
political subterfuge or housing authority boards hostile to their
own responsibilities.
Let me sketch some of the administrative details. An eligible
household would apply for the allowance and furnish evidence of.
its income. An annual income report would be required. An
eligible household would be issued its Housing Allowance in the
form of a check.
Tenants occupying housing units in compliance with local housing
codes would simply endorse the check and turn it over to the
owner along with whatever cash is required to cover the rent.
In the event the tenant occupies a substandard unit, the housing
allowance is not sent to the tenant but held in trust, in the
tenant's name, until such time as the household occupied a unit
in compliance with the codes.
The accumulation of ear-marked housing allowance in this way will
be a means of capital formation for the poor and those of moderate
income. A person would be free to choose to occupy a substandard
unit for a time in order to accumulate a trust fund sufficient
for a down payment on the home which would otherwise have remained
forever beyond reach.
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Owners occupying standard units and qualified by income would
receive the full amount of the allowance in the same way as tenants,
but owners occupying units not in compliance with local codes would
receive no allowance. A subsidiary trust would be established,
however, as part of this program to guarantee the availability of
credit at reasonable interest rates to the eligible owners of sub-
standard housing on the condition that future allowances will be
used to repay the loans necessary to bring the dwelling up to
standard condition.
In all cases, the rent certificates or checks would be endorsed
by the occupant of a standard unit and subsequently endorsed by
the owner. Only the latter may negotiate the rent certificate
for cash at offices of the local public agency or delegated banks.
Here are some of this program's anticipated benefits:
By increasing the buying and negotiating power of all
poor and moderate-income families while making sub-
sidies conditional on residence in standard housing,
we will benefit from powerful market forces in the
upgrading of existing units and the construction of
new homes.
— The dwelling-places of the poor will no longer be set
apart from the balance of the community.
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— All poor and moderate-income families (not just those
for whom public housing units happen to be available)
will receive help, with the poorest receiving the
greatest subsidies.
Incentives will be established to assure owner and/or
tenant cooperation in maintaining decent homes at
prices occupants are willing and able to pay.
Most importantly from the standpoint of areawide housing
policy, poor and moderate-income families will be
able to choose housing in any jurisdicition and in
any location.
A federal housing allowance program as described would do much to
insure that all Americans could afford standard housing. It would
also provide for some increase in areawide housing choices for
low- and moderate-income families. It would not, however,
necessarily overcome the persistent phenomenon of racial resi-
dential segregation.
To open our communities to all races* the state government must
play an important role, probably along the lines of a state
development corporation based on that devised by New York State.
The corporation's first objective would be housing for low and
moderate-income families in a wide range of locations
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with insistence on open occupancy conditions. The corporation
could also develop community facilities and industrial projects.
It would have broad powers of eminent demain, and would be em-
powered not only to plan for the property it acquires but to
develop the land through all stages including management. The
agency would have statewide jurisdiction and would not be governed
by local land-use controls or zoning ordinances but only by the
state's own building code.
The establishment of such a state agency under a clear equity
mandate would weaken the power of local governments to block
federally-assisted housing of all kinds through large-lot zoning
and other manipulations of local ordinances. It would make clear
that we cannot simultaneously enjoy the benefits of large-scale
housing production based on egalitarian considerations, while
allowing fragmented land-use policies by hundreds of tiny com-
munities locked in fiscal competition and planning only to avoid -
not facilitate - change.
Though New York State has already vested power in this kind of
agency, I am frankly not optimistic about its chances in other
states. Most state constitutions are uniformly more restrictive
than facilitative, and constellations of power in the form of
lobbies tend to exert more weight at the state level than at other
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levels of government. Even in New York State, consistent efforts
by UDC to promote housing choices for low-income families in
suburban areas may undermine its freedom to act, as a rural and
suburban-dominated state legislature may constrict its operations.
The same, of course, is true of HUD on the national level as it
attempts to impose sanctions in order to enforce its regulations
in the face of political pressure. Yet, at this point in time,
these seem to be our best options for equitable areawide housing
policies.
The program I have proposed will be expensive and politically
difficult to develop. We have estimated that an adequately-funded
Housing Allowance Program will cost approximately $15 billion
a year — not only a substantial increase in our present commit-
ment to housing but a substantial redistribution of income in
favor of the poor. The political difficulties of using govern-
mental bodies such as state UDC's to destroy residential racial
segregation argue for themselves. Yet, both are linked to an
essential redistribution of income and power in this society which
is overdue.
We can no longer avoid a redistribution of the resources
of this society.
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We can no longer accept subsidy to the richest among us
and rhetoric for the poorest among us.
We can no longer believe in an equitable society with
the evidence of inequity growing around us.
And we can no longer hope that equity will establish
itself inevitably, without sincere efforts on
our part.
I believe that state-wide and equity-based urban development
corporations and a national program of housing allowances are
steps in the right direction. Support for these programs will
involve us in conflict at all levels of government and frequent
disappointments„
Yet your group may be an important ingredient in ultimate success
I invite you to join me in the trenches.
- end -
For Release
Thursday, Dec. 9, 1971
6 P. M.
TRANSPORTATION AND THE INNER-CITY
by Norman Krumholz, Director
Cleveland Planning Commission
for the
American Society of Civil Engineers, Akron Section
December 9, 1971
In the beginning, the American city was compact, its form de-
termined by the distance a man could walk to and from his home to his
work. Later, the form was star-shaped, distended along trolley and
railroad lines where new development took place clustered within
reasonable walking distance from the stations. Finally, in the years
following WW II and continuing through the present, the city virtually
exploded with its components scattered to the four winds and to
a multiplicity of individual jurisdictions in every metropolitan area.
I do not think we can recapture the compact city.
The reasons for these changes in American urban form are not
difficult to identify. They have mainly to do with rising family
incomes, weak or non-existent land use controls in the developing
urban fringe, FHA insurance policies and technological changes.
The most significant of these technological changes have been the
availability of the automobile and the high-speed highway. With
a good car and a good road, locational choices become virtually
unlimited. Those of us who have been able to take advantage of
our automotive civilization have enjoyed the benefits of mobility
and choice unprecedented in human history.
But while most of us were enjoying this mobility, the mobility
of those who lack regular access to a car was suffering both in
absolute and relative terms. There is no question but that the
national majority which has opted for our automotive civilization,
has not only injured the minority but has tended to ignore the
problems it creates for those who do not have a car or those who
cannot drive. As highways and cars have proliferated, and homes
and destinations have scattered, ridership on conventional transit
has sharply declined, fares have been increased and service has
been cut. For the transit-dependent rider, there are fewer and
fewer destinations he can reach at higher and higher prices. CTS,
for example, runs about 200,000 bus miles less in 1970 than it ran
in 1960 for double the fare. It is ironic; at a time when the
central issue of American domestic politics is equality, public
programs overwhelmingly cast in favor of the automobile by our
federal highway policies has opened an ever-widening "mobility gap"
between those who have and those who lack a car.
Those who cannot achieve "automobility" are a substantial group
indeed, especially in the central city. They include the poor, the
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elderly, and those too young or infirm to drive. In the City of
Cleveland, we estimate that 32 percent of all households (about
79,000 households) do not own a car; that of the 46,000 Cleveland
families with annual incomes under $5,000, 46 percent own no car;
that 48 percent of all households headed by persons over 65 have
no car.
It seems to me - in the name of simple justice - that it is
this group which must be the prime beneficiary of improvements in
transportation policy. It is no stretch of the imagination to
 r
state that those people who depend on mass transportation for their
mobility have been "injured" by the national decision to opt for an
automotive civilization, and deserve compensation much in the same
way that those whose homes are taken by a highway are compensated.
Clearly, the broad objective of an equitable transit policy
must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those prevented
by extreme poverty, old age or physical disablement from moving
freely about the metropolitan area.
Just as it is clear that those who depend on transit for their
i
only mobility demand highest priorities in transit policy, so is it
clear that present transit policies serve other objectives almost
exclusively. The main beneficiaries of today's transit subsidies
and most subsidy programs now proposed are the more affluent riders
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of transit and the mass transportation institution itself — not
the transit-dependent riders. This is true from the top - the $3.2
billion available in the Federal Aid Mass Transit Act which has not
been earmarked for people subsidies but for capital grants and
advanced acquisition of rights-of-way for new or extented rail
systems, to the bottom - the flat fare rates which discriminate
against the poor.
In the Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia areas, the most heavily
subsidized transit riders have been the affluent patrons of commuter
railroads. In our own area, the flat-fare structure on the Shaker
Rapid produces a cost of 50C from the Terminal to the E. 55th Street
inner-city stop, and the same cost from the Terminal to Green Road
in Shaker Heights, a ride about as far apart in distance as in
economic status. The much-heralded Bay Area Rapid Transit system -
which will require a projected annual subsidy roughly twice total
fare box revenues - is designed to bring people from well-to-do
suburban areas to the commercial cores of San Francisco and Oakland.
The line has no extensions into North Beach or Chinatown - the
poorest and highest density neighborhoods in San Francisco. This
criticism is more-or-less applicable to the dozen or so new rapid
transit systems now under consideration in metropolitan areas
around the country - in Washington, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh. Each
requires large subsidies and confers the lion's-share of its
benefits on middle- and upper-income riders.
We hear proposals to expand the transit system. If our purpose
is to improve the mobility of the elderly, the poor and the disabled
who are concentrated in the central city, how will the extension of
steel rails into low-density, wealthier suburbs accomplish this?
If the answer to this question is: 'We must bring the poor close to
job opportunities which are decentralizing' is it not more reason-
able to move the residences of the poor close to these jobs and
dispense with the expensive, new transit system?
We hear proposals from time to time to make all public transit
free. How would this sort of proposal benefit the transit-dependent
rider in relation to costs? A recent analysis of a free-transit
proposal in Boston pegs the annual cost of the program at
$75 million. Beneficiaries however, include a large percentage of
people who are neither poor nor dependent on transit, while those
dependent on transit would not necessarily receive any improvement
in service. On the other hand, if the program were properly
directed by specific purpose, the cost of tripling transit service
to and from Boston's poverty areas would cost only $4.3 million
less any fare-box revenues received.
If the primary direction of transit subsidies should be - as
I obviously believe - focused specifically on the needs of the
transit-dependent population, it follows that subsidies should be
channeled to particular users of transit systems rather than to the
systems themselves.
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How can transit best serve this specific objective?
First, let me include in my definition of transit everything
from buses, to taxis, to job jitneys, to car-pools to rail rapid
transit.
Second, let me state that we tend to over sell the ability of
transit alone to accomplish a massive diversion of commuters from
their cars. I see a strong case for improving the quality of the
rail transit system we already have in half a dozen cities, and for
extending the lines in a few cases. But the case for new rail
systems now being made in many cities strikes me as singularly weak.
Finally, let me state that urban transit has four critical needs
in the current eras money, research, testing and managerial innovation.
Until the first is confronted squarely, little progress is likely to
be made with respect to the latter three.
It seems clear that mass transportation in the public interest
cannot operate solely out of the fare box. Mass transit can make
a profit if it deals only with peak-hour demand and the most heavily
travelled routes, but this approach to scheduling will injure
precisely that group which has the strongest claim to transit
improvement. We cannot allow that to happen. Rather, we must insist
that the funds needed to supplement the fare box in the interest of
the transit-dependent population come at least partially from the
Highway Trust Fund which has indirectly restricted their mobility.
With this in mind, I hope that very soon we will see a trans-
formation of the Highway Trust Fund into a combined Transportation
Trust Fund as a single system of transportation finance. This
would be in keeping with trends in the system of highway financing
which are progressively broadening within an ever more-comprehensive
framework. This change would allow local officials to budget a por-
tion of their transportation aid apportionments for transit purposes.
To control misallocation of these funds, a heavy proportion of these
funds would have to be specifically earmarked for direct subsidies
to the transit-dependent rider, much in the way education funds are
earmarked for poverty areas under Title II of the Federal Education
Act.
Now how can we deal with possible ways of administering
subsidies to make fine distinctions among transit users.
One method, already wisely in use in some cities, is the use of
identification cards to those eligible for reduced fares such as
the elderly and school children. It would be relatively simple to
issue similar identification cards subject to a means test to those
qualified for special subsidized fares as a result of low income or
special physical disabilities. >'<•
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A less complicated method which would do away with many
identification cards would be to charge reduced transit fares for
trips beginning or ending in a specified poverty zone. These would
have to be supplemented, however, with special cards to identify
the aged and disabled living outside the poverty areas.
An alternative way of specifically subsidizing the transit-
dependent population would involve putting as much fare collection
as possible — for rich and poor alike — on a charge basis.
Everybody's charge card would look the same but some users - those
qualified by low income or physical disability or age - would
receive a discount on their monthly bill. If the reporting of
income and other data were accurate - which could be assured by
computerized cross checking of income tax returns - the subsidy
could be varied according to the specific characteristics of each
family.
In terms of system modification, I believe the greatest poten-
tial for serving the needs of the transit-dependent population and
perhaps the entire future of transit lies in new systems such as
the Dial-A-Bus which utilize cars and buses and offer door-to-door
pick up and delivery with fare schedules automatically adjusted by
computer. Such a system is in development at M. I.T. But we should
not overlook the broadened use of taxi or jitneys - with or without
sophisticated scheduling and control devices. As a matter of fact,
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taxi cabs could now provide much of the needed service, were it not
for franchise restrictions and prohibitions on group fares.
Let me conclude, by briefly summarizing my recommendations:
1. The primary aims of transit policy should be to
enhance the mobility of those who cannot drive and
those who cannot afford automobile ownership. In
my judgment, this is the only group that has a strong
case for transit subsidization.
2. The most compelling argument for transit subsidies
is that the national majority while opting for an
automotive civilization has unwittingly caused
a reduction in the mobility of the non-driving
minority.
3. The predominant form of transit subsidy should be
reduced fares to needy individuals rather than
grants to support whole services.
4. The main source of subsidies should be transportation
user charges — that is, highway user tax payments
plus the fares of unsubsidized transit patrons -
rather than general tax revenues.
I may have stated some ideas this evening which disagree with
some of your judgments. This does not disturb me. What is vital is
that those with policy responsibility begin to take fresh looks at
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their own preconceptions, at the arguments of their critics and
at the unconventional ideas just visible over the horizon of
feasibility. If I have stimulated even a few of you to undertake
this effort, my purpose is achieved.
, « > - " • '
CLEVELAND VS. NOACA
METROPOLITAN PLANNING AND EQUITY
FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE
ON CENTRAL CITIES AND METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
Detroit, Michigan
April 17, 1972, 1:45 P. M.
by Norman Krumholz, Cleveland City Planning Director, and
Alternate for Mayor Carl Bo Stokes on the NOACA Board
Until December, 1969, the City of Cleveland maintained an
amicable, if somewhat distant, relationship with its seven-county
regional planning agency, the Northeast Ohio Areawide coordinating
Agency (NOACA). Along with most of the other jurisdictions in the
NOACA area, Cleveland had been a reluctant partner in the shotgun
marriage that farmed the agency. All parties to the match regarded
NOACA with some suspicion. The suburbs and rural areas were fearful
that they would be asked to commit some of their resources to the
problems of the central city, and Cleveland was concerned lest
another level come between the city and the federal government on
which it depends heavily for aid. Still, Washington was adamant,
the ramifications of the association were unknown and so, amidst
the usual pronouncements of regional amity, the NOACA union was
joined.
It should be clear that pressure for NOACA did not originate
at the grass roots level with local governments or political leaders.
It originated in the requirements of the Demonstration cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 which, in turn, was a response
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to criticism that federal programs were in poor coordination with
each other and with related local programs. Title II of the Act
(Metropolitan Development) states that after June 30, 1967, all
applications for federal grants or loans for highways and other
transportation projects, open-space projects, hospitals, water
supply and distribution facilities, sewerage and waste treatment
works, etc. must be submitted for review and comment to a duly
constituted metropolitan planning agency. Section 204 of the Act
more or less provides that local governments must set up regional
agencies to review applications for grants and to comment on their
consistency with comprehensive planning in order to qualify for
federal grants-in-aid.
Further emphasis in this direction was provided by Title IV of
the intergovernmental cooperation Act of 1966 and Federal Office of
Management and Budget Circular No. A-95 (1969). Tnis provides for
review of assistance applications for some one hundred federal
grant and loan programs by "clearinghouses" which are usually —
but not always — comprehensive planning agencies. NOACA was one
of the many councils of Government (COG's) and regional planning
bodies formed in response to these directives and, like most
similar agencies, was established by the governments of the region
to do precisely the minimum necessary to keep federal funds
flowing.
That was in 196b. A little more than a year later the City of
Cleveland had bitter reason to feel that it had helped create a body
willing to do major damage to the City's vital interests without
being either able or willing to negotiate any value trade-offs.
For in December, 1969, the HO&CA Board voted overwhelmingly to
approve, over Cleveland's objections, an Interstate Highway (1-290)
through the city's heavily-populated eastside which would have dis-
placed some 1,200 families, destroyed three stable neighborhoods
and removed millions in rateables from the City's sagging tax
duplicate, in taking the action, the Board reversed unanimous
recommendations by NOACA's own technical staff. Planning Council
and Steering Committee, and endorsed, instead, the long-standing
recommendation of the Cuyahoga County Engineer and the Ohio Depart-
ment of Highways.
It seemed to Cleveland's representatives that in taking this
action on 1-290, the NOACA Board indicated its disinterest in con-
fining its activities to simply rubber-stamping non-controversial
grant requests. Nor was it interested in the "coordination" or
"cooperation" specified in the 1962 Highway Act and in various
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Bureau of Public Roads memoranda. Rather, it seemed almost eager
to lend itself to simple political co-optation. In this view, NOACA
merely provided data, financial support and symbolic legitimacy for
a project dominated by the needs of the highway bureaucracy. What
was worse was the realization that Cleveland, with three representa-
tives on a 49-man Board, was virtually powerless to prevent NOACA
from talcing similar disastrous actions in the future.
Reasoning that the agency, as constituted, could only hurt the
city and could not or would not help it, the city chose to fight
rather than acquiesce. The decision was made either to truncate the
power of NOACA to injure vital city interests, or to bring the agency
in line with the letter of federal regulations since these often
speak the language of equity (as well as efficiency) in housing,
employment opportunities and citizen participation and might help
the city.
The events which flowed from the decision to fight are instruc-
tive. They illuminate bitter political in-fighting, but more than
that they suggest some of the fundamentally different objectives
which separate many central cities and the other jurisdictions which
make up regional planning and coordinating agencies.
— Winter, 1969. The 49-man NQACA Board approves 1-290
through the City of Cleveland over the vigorous
objections of the three Cleveland representatives.
(Cleveland has 25 percent of the region's population,
but at this time has only 6 percent of the votes on the
Board.)
— Winter, 1970. Cleveland files suit in federal court
claiming its right to proportional representation
under the one-man, one-vote rule. The city also
refuses to pay its dues to the organization penO\ng
outcome of the suit.
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Spring, 1970. NOACA's Board tables a Cleveland parks-
in-cities application for 50 per cent federal grant
funds for inner-city parks located entirely in Cleve-
land *e ghetto areas.
Spring, 1970. By Board action, Cleveland is stripped of
representation on all KfOACA committees except the
Steering Committee and the Board itself.
Summer, 1970. Cleveland introduces an open housing and
and an affirmative equal employment resolution to the
Board. Part of the housing resolution states that the
entire seven-county region must accept some responsibility
for housing low-income residents of Cleveland displaced
by highways and other programs approved by NOACA. Both
resolutions are heatedly rejected, with one Board member
stating, "We will bury your housing resolution."
Summer* 1970. Compromise agreement is reached on Board
reorganization by a NOACA negotiating committee in-
cluding representatives from Cleveland and the region.
The agreement is rejected by the full Board.
Winter, 1970. Under federal pressure, and without prior
consultation with Cleveland, NOACA reorganizes Board
giving Cleveland 6 representatives on a 52-man body
(Cleveland percentage is raised from 6 per cent to 15
6.
per cent.) City persists in its suit and refusal to
pay its dues.
Spring, 1971. Board member introduces resolution to charge
Cleveland one per cent of estimated project costs for
all City A-95 reviews processed by NOACA. (In the case
of one $10 million sewer application which is pending,
the city would be assessed $100,000 JLn advance.)
Spring, 1971. NOACA Law Enforcement Committee refuses to
process Cleveland's Law Enforcement Assistance grant
applications, claiming that a fee schedule for service
must be worked out first. Cleveland Safety Director
comments that "this is either extortion or blackmail."
Spring, 1971. Cleveland is entirely stripped of its
membership in NOACA for not being in good financial
standing.
Summer, 1971. Cleveland requests an administrative hearing
with various federal agencies citing NOACA hostility to
the City and its apparent unwillingness to conform with
the federal guidelines, especially those dealing with
open housing, equal employment opportunity, and citizen
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participation. The city requests that NOACA be
permanently decertified and a new, more representative
agency be formed.
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— Summer, 1971. HUD finally replaces the federal carrot with
the stick and ~ after considerable local protest —
decertifies the agency.-^
— Pall, 1971. A recertification committee is established by
Mayor Stokes of Cleveland, the State of Ohio* HUD and
NQ&CA. Its purpose is to see that NGACA is recertified
and, to the extent possible, held accountable to HUD
guidelines.
— Fall, 1971. A new Mayor is elected in Cleveland. The city
pays its dues and drops its federal suit and administra-
tive complaints. NQACA remains decertified.
-- Winter, 1972. NQ&CA is recertified by HUD after agreeing
to raise Cleveland's Board representation to 11 (on a
56-man Board), and agreeing to:
a) an affirmative equal employment program
b) restructuring its approach to citizen participation
and allowing citizens, not only Board members, to
serve on this committee
c) accepting a "suitable" housing element as part of
its work program.
what has been accomplished by all these events?
In the narrow view, it appears as if Cleveland has won every-
thing it set out to win (except, possibly, the recall of the original
1-290 decision.) Surely, the city's improved representation on the
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NOACA Board suggests a stronger defense of its interests in future
I-290-type controversies.
But beyond that, probably very little of substance has been
accomplished. Equal employment which might help ease the plight
of the City'8 black unemployed, meaningful citizen participation
which might humanize all public programs by introducing the view-
point of those who often suffer most directly from their impact,
and the provision of more housing choices in the region for those
of low and moderate income, all must await the casual study and
implementation of those who undertook these programs with the
utmost reluctance and then only under the strongest pressures from
HUD.
Will the NOACA Board perceive a new constituency in HUD's
equality guidelines and the needs of the people of the central city?
Doubtful 1 One can expect JMOACA to go on absently rubber-stamping
grant-in-aid requests from constituent municipalities, but one has
difficulty imagining the agency "advising" or "commenting" that
a major program put forth by such majestic, semi-autonomous empires
as the Cuyahoga County Engineer's Office or the Ohio Department of
Highways was poorly conceived or that the location of a proposed
facility was in error. Instead, of course, NOACA will continue to
be intensely supportive of the needs of the highway bureaucracy
given the fragmentation and weakness of local political jurisdictions
and planning agencies compared with the long-term, well-organized.
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well-staffed and exceedingly well-financed highway departments.
(In 1971, over 69 per cent of the total NQACA budget was provided
by Federal Highway Administration funds or local funds matching
FKA monies.)
Most importantly, it seems unrealistic to anticipate substantive
change in the outlook of NOACA Board representatives because the
value systems which are widely shared by suburban and rural politi-
cians and their citizens often specifically exclude concerns which
are essential to the well-being of the people of the central city.
These concerns include equitable policies in such areas as racial
segregation, unemployment, low and moderate-income housing, and
transportation.
The emphasis here is on equity, by which I mean improving the
choices for those in our society who have few or no choices. It
means first, inquiring of all programs or proposals the basic
question: who gets helped and who gets hurt by the program at hand,
and then supporting programs which assure greater opportunities for
those with few choices.
It is precisely this concern for equity which is missing, not
only from the activities of the NOACA Board, but from all of our
attempts to resolve metropolitan problems by whatever device. This
should surprise no one. Although equity as a goal has support in
certain federal regulations and in political rhetoric, it has never
received much support in the formulation of areawide policies.
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Our attempts to resolve the problems of our metropolitan areas have
uniformly concentrated on service and the ease of administration
rather than on considerations of equity.
Tne park districts, sewer and water districts, stadium and
transportation authorities and the COGS and regional planning
agencies, which abound on the metropolitan scene were neither con-
ceived nor constructed in terms of equity, but speak only the lan-
guage of hostility to waste and "efficiency." But the promise of
efficiency says nothing about the appropriateness of policy, nor
about the relevance of program, nor about the incidence of benefits
and costs to different economic groups in the region.
Our easy contentment with mere service and efficiency answers
to metropolitan problems presents us with major difficulties when
we try to frame equitable areawide policies. What is more, one
clear result of federal pressure for regional cooperation and
coordination is to channel more power to the suburbs at the expense
of the central city.
Two examples in the functional areas of transportation and
housing should underline this point.
As a society, we have opted for an automotive civilization con-
ferring vastly improved access and mobility on the majority, in the
process, we have ignored the problems which this auto-age creates for
those who cannot own or drive a car. The poor, the elderly, the
disabled and those too young to drive must pay more and more for
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public transportation, while having fewer and fewer places they can
reach. And this group is a substantial part of the population of
any central city. In Cleveland in 1965, an estimated 32 per cent
of all households did not own a car; of 45,000 families with incomes
under $4,000, 46 per cent owned no car; of households headed by
persons over 65, 48 per cent had no car.
In the interests of equity and simple justice, it is this
group which must be the prime beneficiary of transportation subsi-
dies. It is this priority which must be emphasized again and again
at the highest levels. And it should be made clear that the needs
of these transit-dependent riders will not be served by a "compre-
hensive plan" for transportation, nor by rail extensions into the
suburbs, nor by broad subsidies to public transit systems, but by
subsidies directed specifically for their use.
As representatives of the City of Cleveland, we are well aware ••
of this priority. We proposed to deal with it specifically in an
application for a transit study which was submitted to the Depart-
went of Transportation in 1970. The people at DOT told us to go away \
until we had a joint City-County proposal. We returned to our labors
and, lo, just such a joint proposal emerged, which we then brought
back to DOT for approval.
But the federal agency was not satisfied that the joint city-
county proposal was sufficiently comprehensive; after all, parts
of the larger region were urbanizing and transportation proposals
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would have an impact there. Also, a similar two-county transit
study was underway in the neighboring Akron region. So the joint
city-county study committee of eleven members was reconstituted as
a special committee of the seven-county WQACA; the scope of the
study was broadened from one to five counties; and the study com-
mittee itself was broadened to twenty-one members of which the City
of Cleveland appoints tnree.
Given this newly "comprehensive" committee it seems likely to
expect the following events unless the strongest attention is given
to the specific needs of the transit-dependent population:
1) The transit-dependent element will be given high priority
in the study outline at the insistence of city represen-
tatives, but the study will begin loy emphasizing suburban
trips to downtown.
2) After one year of study, the committee will make a large
grant application to finance two rapid transit rail lines
into the suburbs. The politics — not the planning — of
the committee membership will make this action virtually
inevitable. Cleveland's representatives will protest
that the transit-dependent component is incomplete and that
grant applications should await its completion. They might
even threaten to withdraw the city's support from the study.
3) Politicians representing suburban and county constituents
and powerful business leaders will be fearful of the loss
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of "federal dollars" and will urge the city's representa-
tives to yield. The newspapers will refer to the city's
people as "divisive" and "parochial." Editorials will call
for unity and a regional view for the betterment of all.
The city will capitulate.
4) The Department of Transportation will approve a substantial
grant for the suburban rail extensions, advising that future
applications must await additional congressional appropria-
tions. In the general euphoria following the grand announce-
ment the transit-dependent component of the plan will be
quietly cropped.
t>) In five years, affluent suburbanites in the region will be
aole to choose either one of their two cars or the rapid
for transportation while, left unattended, central-city
people dependent on public transit will pay more and more
for less and less mobility.
The issue of equity is more acute in housing than in transpor-
tation. In this field, we know we have failed our low-income popu-
lation tragically. We know we can no longer rely on housing programs
for low-income families which do not serve all families eligible, or
limit the housing choices of the poor both as to location and type.
We know we must design and initiate a low-income housing pro-
gram where:
— the poor are not set apart in a particular location or
jurisdiction.
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— subsidies are available to all poor residents with the
poorest receiving the greatest subsidy
the poor may enjoy ordinary choices in the type of
housing they occupy.
Designing such a program is obviously one of WOACA's responsi-
bilities. But will the representatives of coivununities which have
successfully locked out the poor through legal and administrative
subterfuge endorse and promote such a program? will they support
some concept of equity - perhaps based on New York State's Urban
Development Corporation? The answer is clearly "no".
Most of the ardent supporters of regional planning* regional
coordination and metropolitan authorities or governments campaign
under the banner of efficiency — less traffic congestion, less
costly water and sewer services* less overlapping and duplication.
Surely, these are important considerations.
But a more inspiring vision is in order. Equity must come to
sit at the right hand of efficiency. Justice must swing toward
a better balance in our society — between young and old, white and
black, rich and poor.
But the scales of justice are heavy and they move only with
great effort. Who will throw his weight into that balance in behalf




1) See particularly U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and
Procedure Memorandum 50-9, "Urban Transportation Planning",
June 21, 1967
2) in its administrative complaints, Cleveland contended:
a) that NOACA ignored HUD requirements to develop plans and
programs related to low-income and minority groups in the
area of housing, water and sewer development and other
programs, and ignored low-income and minority group views
in these areas (ref: P. 44, Par. 13, Sec. 4, Chapt. 4,
Comprehensive Planning Assistance — Handbook I — Guide-
lines Leading to a Grant - March 1969 - A HUD Handbook
iVOD 6041.1)
b) that NOACA failed to comply with HUD Equal Employment
Opportunity provisions (ref: P. 10, Par. 7(e) Sec. 1, and
Appendix 2 MPD 6415.1A)
c) that NOACA ignored the requirement for citizen participa-
tion in NOACA affairs (ref: P. 46, Sec. 20, Chapt. 4 and
Pgs. 7-fc Sec. 3, Chapt. 1, A HUD Handbook and Circular
6415.1A, P. 20, Par. 16)
d) that NOACA failed to meet the HUD Housing Element Require-
ments (ref: P. 44, Par. 12, Sec. 4, Chapt. 4 and Appen-
dix 2A )
3) NOACA was decertified pursuant to HUD Circular MPD 6415.1A,
Par. 7. With Cleveland out of NOACA the agency no longer met
the requirement that its membership include central cities and
other units representing at least 75 percent of the population
of the planning area.
